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Introduction
The evolution of the law on non-profit hospital property tax exemption has reached a
pivotal juncture. Critical partnerships with physicians on the property, necessary to operate a
modern hospital, may subject the property-owner to a revocation of its exemption because of the
physicians’ presumable profit-making nature. Healthcare continues to grow more complex and
expensive, requiring hospitals to be innovative in their business decisions and approaches to care.
Non-profit hospitals offer unprofitable, but essential services that may be abandoned without tax
subsidies bolstering the bottom line.

If the law continues to develop on its current path,

municipalities should take careful consideration of important public policy concerns as to whether
they should revoke non-profit hospitals’ status and prompt litigation.
Statutory History & Interpretation: Tax Exemption Requires Satisfying Three Criteria
The New Jersey Constitution vests power in the state to exempt from taxation property
used for a broad range of charitable purposes.2 The controlling statute, § 54:4-3.6, states the
following as it pertains to hospitals:
The following property shall be exempt from taxation under this
chapter. . . . all buildings actually used in the work of associations
and corporations organized exclusively for hospital purposes,
provided that if any portion of a building used for hospital purposes
is leased to a for-profit making organizations or otherwise used for
purposes which are not themselves exempt from taxation, that
portion shall be subject to taxation and the remaining portion only
shall be exempt. . . .3
The public policy behind the statute is to permit an exception for special categories of
property owners because ordinarily, all property owners bear their burden in the just and equal
share of taxation.4 Exemption from taxation is a departure from the status quo and claims are to
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be strongly construed against the property owner.5 The claimant bears the burden of establishing
a case for exemption by satisfying a three-pronged test.6 The property must: (1) be owned by an
entity organized exclusively for the exempt purpose; (2) the property must be actually used for the
tax-exempt purpose; and (3) its operation and use must not be conducted for profit.7
A.

Organization-Prong
Subsequent decisions have applied this three-pronged test in the hospital context.8 The

organization-prong is to be assessed with regards to the entity’s statement of purposes in its
certificate of incorporation.9 In Hunterdon Medical Center v. Readington Township, the tax court
held that “HMC’s certificate of incorporation . . . when read literally, could be construed to
authorize activities other than the operation of a hospital. However, when read sensibly and
reasonably, the certification satisfies the statutory requirement that HMC be organized exclusively
for hospital purpose.”10 From this it can be inferred that so long as the hospital’s certificate of
incorporation makes clear that its mission is hospital purposes, no hospital will have its exemption
status pulled under this prong.
B.

Use-Prong
The use-prong has been the focal point of significant litigation and statutory changes. In

City of Long Branch v. Monmouth Medical Center, the property lost complete exemption because
of the arrangements within certain hospital buildings.11 Physicians who rented hospital space for
their professional practices to treat their own private patients in the offices presumably derived
pecuniary profit.12 The Appellate Division in Long Branch held that “the utilization of these
buildings for the private practice of medicine and dentistry is purely and simply a private profitmaking activity, and is in direct competition with the privately owned commercial rental buildings
and goes far beyond the traditional functions and purposes of a hospital.”13 Based on these
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findings, the property was not “actually and exclusively” used for hospital purposes as required in
the statute.14
The Legislature subsequently amended the statute to remove the exclusivity requirement
because of the overly strict effect it imposed.15 The amendment’s purpose was to allow exempt
associations to receive a partial real property tax exemption for buildings partially used for their
own charitable purposes, distinct from facilities used for non-exempt purposes or leased to profitmaking tenants.16 Thus the use-test is an inquiry into how each portion of the building is used.
The amendment does not advance impermissible commingling of non-profit and for-profit
activities, but rather the change allows for some for-profit activity to take place so long as it can
be segregated and measured for local taxing purpose.17
The New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with a use-prong issue in Hunterdon Medical
Center to determine whether an off-site building that housed the hospital’s Health and Wellness
Center was exempt.18 Here, the Court forged an important development in the law by greatly
expanding the previous statutory interpretation of “hospital purposes” for a hospital’s main
campus.19
Now, “hospital purposes” in the context of determining tax exemption is inclusive of any
medical service that a patient may require pre-admission, during a hospital stay, or postadmission.20 Whether a medical or diagnostic service is conducted on the main campus or in an
immediately adjacent building is immaterial so long as the service is necessary to meet the needs
of the patient.21 The Supreme Court rejected the previous construction of “hospital” as strictly a
place where a patient could receive twenty-four-hour continuous care.22 This was held to be too
restrictive in analyzing tax exemption status due to the evolving nature of modern hospitals.23

3

The greatly expanded definition in conjunction with the amendment in response to Long
Branch significantly broadens the scope of what qualifies as appropriate use under the use-prong.
The Supreme Court’s aim in Hunterdon was to “infuse meaning into the concept of ‘hospital
purposes’ so that the statutory exemption can be consistently applied.”24 So long as the property
is used to administer some medical service on the property, the “use” is presumptively for core
“hospital purposes” and should be deemed tax-exempt eligible under the use test.25
C.

Profit-Prong
The profit-prong is a “pragmatic inquiry into profitability. . . . [A] realistic common sense

analysis of the actual operation of the taxpayer; mechanical centering on income and expense
figures is to be avoided.”26 A holistic inquiry should be undertaken when considering where the
profit goes27: “If [the court] can trace it into someone’s personal pocket . . . the entity is not entitled
to tax exemption.”28 The essential focus is on whether the exempt entity engages in forbidden
profit-making activity for itself, meaning that the dominant motive behind the organization’s
conduct cannot be to generate a profit. 29
AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown
In 2010, the tax court ruled on cross-motions for partial summary judgment from
Morristown and AHS Hospital Corp. (d/b/a Morristown Hospital).30 Morristown sought to revoke
the exemption status of the rented office space in the cancer center, children’s hospital, and café
space of Morristown Memorial Hospital, while the hospital sought to reaffirm the exemption of
the remainder of the subject property.31 On Morristown’s motion, the parties heavily disagreed
over the Hospital’s claim that it had satisfied both the use and profit-prongs designated by the
court.32 However, citing Hunterdon Medical Center, the court found that resolution of the profitprong was dispositive for both parties’ motions.33 In holding that “the use-for-an-exempt purpose
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[prong] is superfluous when property is otherwise ineligible because a for-profit activity is
conducted on it[,]”34 the tax court’s interpretation raises a fundamental question on the interplay
between the two prongs.
Portions of the cancer center and children’s hospital were leased to private physicians to
conduct their practice. They were required to be a member of the hospital’s medical staff and were
awarded certain privileges, but they were not paid by the hospital as employees. 35 The tax court
granted Morristown’s motion, heavily relying on the facts of City of Long Branch.36 The
arrangements at Morristown Memorial Hospital similarly gave rise to the presumption that the
private physicians derived pecuniary profit from their use of their office space, which in the tax
court’s view was a violation of the profit-test, despite the issue being framed in City of Long
Branch as what would be a standard use-prong concern.37
In rejecting the hospital’s argument about the different legal issue, the tax court reasoned
that “regardless if such a use is reasonably necessary under the expanded definition of ‘hospital
purposes,’ it does not negate the commercial nature of the use of the office space by the private
physicians and the other private parties.”38 Thus effectively, the tax court created a novel method
in between the partial revocations under the use-prong, and complete revocation under the profitprong, by revoking exemption for the portion of the property that it held violated the profit-prong.
This ruling on Morristown’s partial summary judgment raises significant concerns for other New
Jersey hospitals if—and when—the tax court’s analysis proceeds to its logical conclusion in
subsequent cases. Consequently, any relationship with a profit-making entity on the property
could be both a use-prong and profit-prong issue making modern hospitals subject to both partial
revocation under both prongs, or complete revocation as a per se violation under the profit-prong.
Analysis of AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown
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The tax court rejected the argument that Hunterdon Medical Center’s expanded definition
of hospital purposes distinguishes the analysis the tax court should engage from that done in the
City of Long Branch.39 Instead, the tax court used Hunterdon Medical Center to stand for the
proposition that the use-prong is superfluous when property is otherwise ineligible because of a
violation of the other prongs.40 The tax court’s reliance on Hunterdon Medical Center in
conjunction with City of Long Branch in AHS Hosp. Corp. may cause inconsistent results in its
application because as a matter of statutory interpretation, “construction that will render any part
of a statute inoperative, superfluous, or meaningless, is to be avoided.41
The tax court’s holding results in the same disproved constructive effect rejected in Paper
Mill Playhouse. There, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected Millburn’s contention that
regardless of the theater’s intentions, because it at times rendered a surplus, it was a “commercial
enterprise.”42 If the Supreme Court were to have adopted Millburn’s proposed reasoning it would
have nullified the profit-prong. The test is simply stated by the Supreme Court as “. . . whether or
not [the entity] is ‘conducted for the purpose of making a profit.’”43 Millburn’s contention that the
non-profit should lose its exemption by maintaining a surplus was inconsistent with the adopted
interpretation. The profit-prong asks why a surplus is maintained and whether the money inures
to the benefit of an individual, not simply whether a surplus exists.
The Supreme Court in Hunterdon Medical Center greatly expanded hospital purposes for
the use-prong, but did not disturb the prevailing interpretation of the profit-prong.44 The use-test
asks whether the property is “actually used” for the exempt purpose, while the profit-test asks
whether the purpose is conducted for a profit.45 The tax court in AHS Hosp. Corp. would be correct
if it found that the hospital’s purpose is to conduct itself for profit and it completely revoked the
exemption. Beyond this finding, it would be unnecessary to ascertain whether the specific use of
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the property by entities on the property were for hospital purposes since the profit-prong is
dispositive in this hypothetical. However, the reasoning upon which Morristown’s motion was
granted created a subtle but critical change in the articulation of the profit-prong.
By holding that the profit-prong is dispositive and finding City of Long Branch persuasive,
the tax court is reinterpreting the profit-prong to ask whether the use is by a profit-making entity,
as opposed to whether the hospital’s purpose is for-profit.46 Consequently, a hospital may be in
compliance with the use-prong for conducting a “hospital purpose” under Hunterdon, but if that
physician generates a profit for herself, the expanded definition of “hospital purposes” is voided
and that portion of the property loses its exemption under the profit-prong. This nullifies the useprong in the hospital context because it logically follows that any physician relationship found on
the property is subsequently taxable. Leases to a for-profit making organization, which would be
taxable under the use-prong, are “superfluous” to the profit-prong because inevitably the physician
will get paid for her services.47
The reality of a modern hospital is that every physician whose practice is conducted in the
hospital derives private profit, regardless of whether they are positioned there because of a contract
or lease. The State Supreme Court has warned that to permit a nonprofit entity to remain tax
exempt when it has become inseparably commingled with for-profit entities would be against the
principles of the profit-prong.48 The commingling with for-profit entities must be separately
accountable for taxation purposes under the use-prong, but if the commingling is so pervasive, it
can still give rise to an entity’s dominant motive being to support the for-profit entities and violate
the profit-prong.49 This recognized interplay between the use-prong and profit-prong still adheres
to the holistic-inquiry of determining the property-owner’s purpose. If the AHS Hosp. Corp.
interpretation of City of Long Branch is taken to its logical conclusion that there is no necessary

7

use-prong inquiry when there are profit-making entities on the property, the dominant motive
behind a hospital cannot be seen as anything more than being a space for for-profit physicians to
carry out their practice and is therefore completely taxable.
The Nature of Modern Hospitals
New Jersey has promulgated an extensive list of rules required for licensure to assure the
high quality of care throughout hospitals in the state.50 To accomplish complete medical care
hospitals are required to have special physician groups accomplish majority of their practice onsite including radiology, anesthesia, pathology, and emergency medicine.51 The New Jersey
Supreme Court, while acknowledging that the licensure regulations are not conclusive on the
question of the use, recognizes that the regulations are aligned with its expanded definition of
“hospital purposes” to “adequately address the needs of all of the types of patients that a hospital
is expected to serve.”52 Consultation prior to surgery by anesthesiologists, tissue testing by
pathologists and emergency medicine are performed by contracted, for-profit physician groups
without whom hospitals would operate less efficiently resulting in lower quality patient care.53
The tax court’s granting of Morristown’s partial summary judgment on the presumption of
pecuniary benefit raises concerns for all hospital facilities based on some integral services provided
by for-profit medical staffs on the property.54 Hospitals improve the quality of patient care by
bringing together in one facility professionals in varied but related practices.55 The tax court found
that the commercial nature of these physicians’ private practice to be dispositive without regard to
the desirability of the necessity of improving patient care by co-locating physician practices in
single facility. Extending this reasoning would be a serious threat to any hospital that contracts
with private physician groups.
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An expansive scholarly debate exists on the legitimacy of non-profit hospital exemptions
in respect to their market behavior. Some commentators assert that non-profits act like for-profits
and should be taxed accordingly.56 In a competitive marketplace, hospitals necessarily have to act
as business entities in order to provide efficient services.57 With the changes in how healthcare is
approached through expansive research, technology, and holistic care, more strategic business
decisions about how to obtain the necessary capital must be made.58 The traditional profit-test
implicitly recognizes this reality. In Paper Mill, the Supreme Court reasoned that “ordinary
prudent judgment requires that nonprofit organizes, like other organizations, try to generate a
surplus for emergencies, and, in this case, capital expansion. . . . In cases where we have held that
the taxpayer was operating for a profit, the profit arose from the nonexempt operation of the
organization.”59
Hospitals across the state are no longer the fifty-bed facilities constructed decades ago, as
evidenced by AHS reporting its incoming-producing activity to be over one billion dollars in its
Form 990.60 Consequently, towns have a much greater stake today in asserting a challenge to
collect property taxes from these now massive entities. Municipalities are still required to provide
non-profits with public services such as police, fire protection, and street maintenance which
together come at a much greater cost when considering the breadth of a hospital’s daily activities
and size. From the town’s perspective, it seems unjust that a dominant entity that acts, looks, and
feels like a for-profit business is exempt from paying its fair share of the public burden of taxation.
One scholar asserts that local governments must balance the benefits provided to the community
by the non-profit hospital with restrictions on the hospital’s ability to acquire new technologies if
it is no longer fully subsidized.61
Consequences of Losing Exemption Status
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The burden is on the party asserting exemption to demonstrate that it does not violate the
profit-prong.62 As a result of AHS Hospital Corp., the threshold for successfully defending an
exemption has been raised if the profit-test is violated by a use of the property by a profit-making
entity, irrespective of the purpose behind the use. Further exacerbating the issue, traditionally the
binary nature of the statute does not allow for partial exemption under the profit-test.63 In 2012,
New Jersey hospitals operated at roughly a three percent margin, nearly half that of the national
average.64 Therefore, incurring large tax bills with significant interest because of complete
revocation may cause hospitals to consider reducing the services it provides.65
From a market standpoint, hospitals will likely be forced to cut the most unprofitable
services in order to stay afloat. With the cuts, it is the public that receives the brunt of the harm
without a place to receive charitable care. The traditional notions of a hospital’s charitable mission
have included vital research centers, teaching hospitals, and other preventive health measures.
These expensive and unprofitable services may no longer be offered if non-profit hospitals can no
longer establish a case for exemption.66
Closing Remarks
In order to be a successful hospital in the modern world, it is necessary for non-profit
hospitals to retain relationships with outside for-profit physicians. Within having to satisfy all
three prongs of Paper Mill Playhouse, justifying the physician-hospital relationship has become
increasingly more important element. If the utilization of for-profit entities on the property, which
historically would cause those portions of the property to be taxable under the use-prong, runs the
risk for a complete exemption under the profit-prong, then non-profit hospitals in the state face a
significant threat to their exemption status. A complete revocation of exemption has a vast impact
on the community that the hospital services. Municipalities should consider whether the utility of
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having a non-profit hospital providing quality services is outweighed by its seemingly for-profit
nature.
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